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ABSTRACT 
 
 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH SMEs IN 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
 
Cakova, Uğur 
M.S., Department of Management 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Zeynep Önder 
 
August 2011 
 
This thesis investigates the determinants of capital structure of small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) from manufacturing sector in Turkey. Hypotheses about 
leverage decisions and debt maturity choices of firms are formulated based on the 
capital structure theories, mainly trade-off theory and pecking order theory. These 
hypotheses are tested using fixed effects model with unbalanced panel data set of 
44,029 firm-year observations over the period between 1998 and 2008. I find that 
capital structure decisions of Turkish SMEs are in line with pecking order 
predictions. The results indicate that larger firms have higher leverage ratios; 
SMEs use their tangible assets to obtain long term debt; profits are used to 
decrease debt levels, particularly short term debt; firms with high growth 
opportunities prefer to finance their future growth with long term debt; rapidly 
growing firms use more short term debt to finance their growth. In general, SMEs 
are found to decrease their leverage ratio during the periods of economic growth. 
Lastly, although small and medium sized firms have significantly different debt 
ratios over the sample period, results are homogenous across both individual 
samples of small firms and medium firms. 
 
 
Keywords: Capital Structure, pecking order theory, SMEs, trade-off theory 
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ÖZET 
 
KOBĐ’LERDE SERMAYE YAPISINI ETLĐYEN FAKTÖRLERĐN 
ĐMALAT SANAYĐĐNDE SINANMASI 
 
Cakova, Uğur 
Yüksek Lisans, Đşletme Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi:  Doç. Dr. Zeynep Önder 
 
 
Ağustos 2011 
 
Bu tez, Türkiye’de imalat sektöründe yer alan Küçük ve Orta Büyüklükteki 
Đşletmelerin (KOBĐ) sermaye yapısını etkileyen faktörleri araştırmaktadır. 
Şirketlerin borçlanma kararları ile ilgili hipotezler, dengeleme teorisi ve finansal 
hiyeraşi teorisi gibi sermaye yapısı teorileri incelenerek geliştirilmiştir. Bu 
hipotezler, 1998-2008 dönemini kapsayan ve 44,029 gözlemden oluşan panel veri 
üzerinde, sabit etkiler modeli kullanılarak sınanmıştır. Türk KOBĐlerinin sermaye 
yapısı kararları finansal hiyeraşi teorisini desteklemektedir. Sonuçlara göre daha 
büyük firmalar daha yüksek borç oranına sahip olmakta; KOBĐler maddi duran 
varlıklarını uzun vadeli borç sağlamak için kullanmakta; elde edilen kar öncelikle 
kısa vadeli borç olmak üzere borç oranları azaltılmak için kullanılmakta; yüksek 
büyüme olanaklarına sahip firmalar gelecekteki büyümelerini uzun vadeli borç 
kullanarak, hızlı büyüyen firmalar ise büyümelerini kısa vadeli borç kullanarak 
finanse etmektedir. Ekonomik büyüme gerçekleşen dönemlerde firmaların borç 
oranlarını azalttıkları gözlemlenmiştir. Son olarak, küçük ve orta ölçekteki 
firmaların borç oranları incelenen dönemde anlamlı bir biçimde farklı olsa da, 
elde edilen sonuçlar iki tür firma için bir farklılık göstermemektedir.     
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Dengeleme teorisi, finansal hiyeraşi teorisi, sermaye yapısı, 
KOBĐ 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Deciding on capital structure is very critical for every firm. Most of the empirical 
studies investigating capital structure decisions examine firms that are generally 
publicly traded. Zingales (2000) supports this view as follows, “Empirically, the 
emphasis on large companies has led us to ignore (or study less than necessary) 
the rest of the universe: the young and small firms, who do not have access to 
public markets”.  
 
Small and medium sized firms are very important for the economy. European 
Commission (2009) report states that more than 99.8% of European businesses are 
produced by SMEs in 2008 and they provide more than two-third of private sector 
employments. Moreover, SMEs contribute to more than half of total value added 
created by businesses in the European Union (EU). In other words, they are the 
main source of employment and they have a very important role in economical 
growth.  
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Turkey is similar to European countries. According to European Commission 
(2009), in 2008, 99.9% of enterprises are considered as SMEs and their 
contribution to the overall economy is 51% in value added terms, which is lower 
than EU-27 average (57.9%). On the other hand, the contribution of Turkish 
SMEs to total employment is 81.7%, which is much higher than the European 
average (67.4%).     
 
SMEs do not need special attention just because they constitute an important 
portion in the economy. They have also unique characteristics that differentiate 
them from larger ones. SME owners’ desire for control and more severe 
information asymmetry problems are the two main factors that lie behind these 
differences (Bhaird and Lucey, 2010). Furthermore, SMEs are much more fragile 
than large companies. 20% of newly founded SMEs are closed in a year and 
higher portion of them closed during their second year (DPT, 2006). Therefore, it 
is very essential to identify the factors that influence the financial structure of 
small and medium sized companies.  
 
The capital structure of SMEs has been investigated for several countries, 
including Australia (Romano et al., 2000; Cassar and Holmes, 2003), Belgium 
(Heyman et al., 2008), Germany (Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993), Ireland 
(Bhaird and Lucey, 2010), the Netherlands (Degryse et al., 2010), Poland 
(Klapper et al., 2006), Portugal (Pindado et al., 2006), Spain (Sogorb-Mira, 2005), 
the U.K. (Chittenden et al., 1996; Michaelas et al.,1999). In general, they find that 
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the information asymmetry costs and agency costs are the main factors that 
influence the financing decisions of SMEs. These studies indicate that the most 
influential variables on capital structures of SMEs are found as size, profitability, 
growth rate, asset tangibility, tax rate and growth opportunities. 
 
Since previous studies mostly applied on developed countries, discovering 
financial determinants of SMEs in a developing country like Turkey is 
particularly interesting. There exist limited number of capital structure studies in 
Turkey and most of them examine listed and big companies that may not face 
with asymmetric information problems in financing. Korkmaz et al. (2007) 
investigate capital structure of SMEs whose stocks are traded on Istanbul Stock 
Exchange. Korkmaz et al. (2009) examine determinants of capital structure of 16 
listed companies from automotive and auto parts industry. Doğukanlı and 
Acaravcı (2004), Akkaya and Güler (2008) and Yıldız et al. (2009) test capital 
structure determinants of listed manufacturing companies. Studies in Turkey are 
also in line with studies conducted in other countries.  
 
In this thesis, I empirically investigate the factors that affect financial structures of 
Turkish SMEs operating in manufacturing industry. I focus on their leverage 
decisions as well as their debt maturity choices. I especially work on 
manufacturing sector because it provides 32% of the employment in Turkey and 
99.63% of enterprises in manufacturing sector is SMEs. Moreover, on average, 
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54% of total investment incentives given by government are utilized by firms 
operating in manufacturing sector.  
 
My dataset contains 44,029 firm-year observations. It covers 14 sub-sectors of 
manufacturing industry over eleven year period between 1998 and 2008. 
Although only firms from manufacturing sector are analyzed in this study, the 
sample is more comprehensive than the previous studies. I test predictions of 
trade-off theory and pecking order theory on the data. I also analyze small firms 
(46% of total observations) and medium firms (54% of total observations) 
separately. Furthermore, since previous papers like Van der Wijst and Thurik 
(1993), Michaelas et al. (1999), Degryse et al. (2010) find that there exist 
significant differences in the capital structures of SMEs across industries, I 
analyze whether there exist any differences in capital structures of companies 
operating in several sub-industries within manufacturing sector. Whether firm 
characteristics or sub-industry differences are more important in determining 
capital structure is also examined. According to World Competitiveness 
Yearbook, Turkeys’ competitiveness exhibits a downward trend between 2001 
and 2004 and is able to observe its ranking in 2001 again in 2005 (DPT, 2006). 
Since SMEs are fragile companies, changes in economy generally have amplified 
results over them. Considering the economically instable nature of Turkey, 
whether capital structures of SMEs change over years is also investigated. 
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Two way fixed effects model is estimated to explain total debt, short term debt 
and long term debt ratios of SMEs. The first set of regressions is composed of 
firm and year effects and the second set of regressions estimate sector and year 
fixed effects. The results confirm that capital structure decisions of Turkish SMEs 
are consistent with pecking order theory. It is found that larger firms have higher 
leverage. This positive relation between size and leverage is found to be greater 
for long term debt. Moreover, SMEs use collaterals to obtain especially long term 
debt. SMEs with higher amount of collaterals switch from short term debt to long 
term debt. The maturity matching principle is also supported since firms match 
duration of their assets with the duration of their liabilities. SMEs with higher 
profitability ratios use less debt. In addition, SMEs seems to use profits to reduce 
especially short term debt. SMEs with higher growth opportunities have higher 
leverage. Just like collaterals, SMEs seem to use their growth opportunities to 
obtain long term debt and decrease their short term debt levels. However, current 
growth is found to increase debt levels of all kind of maturities. The results 
suggest that fast growing firms are likely to have insufficient funds to finance 
their growth internally and use short term debt as first resort since it may be 
harder to obtain long term debt.  
 
Regarding the year effects, the SMEs have debt levels higher between 1998 and 
2001. The year of banking crisis, 2001, is the year that SMEs are found to have 
the highest debt ratio. After 2001, a substantial decrease in debt ratios is observed 
with economic improvements in the country. Moreover, I observe a negative 
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relation between debt ratios and economic conditions. That is, firms decrease their 
average debt ratios as economic conditions improve. Firm characteristics are 
found to affect capital structure of SMEs more than the characteristics of their 
sub-sectors. Across 14 sub-sectors examined, only 4 of them have significantly 
different total debt ratios than others. The food products, beverages and tobacco 
sub-sector is found to have the highest debt while manufacture of pulp, paper and 
paper products publishing and printing sub-sector has the lowest ratio.  
 
Although findings are valid for both small sized firms and medium sized firms, 
their separate analysis shows that there exist differences in the magnitudes of the 
coefficients. Medium sized firms are found to have relatively more long term debt 
ratio and less short term debt ratio. This finding can be explained as follows: 
smaller firms may have more problems in obtaining long term debt or firms may 
use more long term debt as they get larger. The results suggest that small firms 
rely more on collaterals since they have relatively higher information asymmetry 
problems. It is also found that medium firms are more profitable and have more 
opportunities to decrease their debt ratios by using their profits. Furthermore, 
small firms are more likely to have insufficient funds to finance their growth since 
growth is found to have a greater impact on small firms. 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a 
summary of major capital structure theories and reviews the literature about the 
determinants of capital structures of SMEs in several countries. Chapter 3 
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introduces the hypotheses tested in this thesis. In Chapter 4, data, variables and 
empirical model are presented. I discuss empirical results in Chapter 5. Finally, I 
conclude in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1 Capital Structure Theories 
 
The choices of firms regarding their capital structure and what is the optimal 
capital structure are long lasting questions that researchers are looking for an 
answer. In 1955, Weston underline that “there can be no science of business 
finance since experts cannot arrive at unique answers”. There are mainly three 
capital structure theories in the literature that provides different answers for the 
optimal debt usage. In this chapter, first, I briefly explain these theories. Then, I 
present empirical evidence regarding to the determinants of capital structures of 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in different countries.   
 
 
2.1.1 The Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
 
Modigliani-Miller (MM) irrelevance theorem is a cornerstone in capital structure 
literature. Although Williams (1938) presents similar ideas, he does not provide 
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an arbitrage based proof. So, MM (1958) is considered to be the first accepted 
capital structure theory. 
 
The first proposition of MM (1958) states that, under perfect market conditions 
(in efficient markets with no taxes, no bankruptcy costs, and no asymmetric 
information), how a firm is financed has no effect on its value. The value of the 
company is determined by the amount of cash flows coming from investments and 
other activities, and the risk associated with these cash flows. The debt-to-equity 
is used only to split the cash flows between equity holders and lenders. Since in a 
world with no tax, these cash flows are independent from the financing decisions, 
capital structure has no effect on the firm’s value. Hence, the MM theorem is also 
called as the capital structure irrelevance principle.  
 
Even though the MM theorem only holds in their theoretical world with 
unrealistic assumptions, it is still very important because they attracted and 
stimulated many researchers to develop new theories on capital structure.  
 
 
2.1.2 Trade-off Theory 
 
The MM (1958) model is criticized, mainly because it has very unrealistic 
assumptions and fails when taxes, bankruptcy costs, or asymmetric information 
were introduced. In their later paper, MM (1963) introduced taxes to their model. 
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They find that firm value is positively related with the amount of debt used. In 
other words, it is specified as a linear function of debt-equity ratio and maximized 
with 100% usage of debt financing (MM, 1963). In this model, they assume that 
there is no bankruptcy cost. However, there exists an offsetting cost of debt which 
avoids this extreme choice. There is an increasing stress of bankruptcy with 
increasing usage of debt. Therefore, bankruptcy is the balancing factor for the 
extreme situation shown by MM in 1963. 
 
Myers (1984) modified the MM (1963) model and developed the ‘static trade-off’ 
theory. It claims that there is a trade-off between benefits of debt usage and the 
financial distress, which occurred because of the increase in the likelihood of 
bankruptcy with the higher usage of debt. According to Myers’ (1984) trade-off 
theory, firms have their target debt levels and make their capital structure 
decisions accordingly.  
 
Below, Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the trade-off theory. 
According to this theory, as ratio of debt in the capital structure increases, first, 
the value of firm increases because of the increase in the present value of marginal 
tax shield. However, at higher levels of debt ratio, the increase in the present 
value of cost of financial distress will offset the increase in the marginal benefits 
and as debt ratio increases, the value of firm will decline. This allows the firms to 
optimize their debt levels. 
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Figure 1 - The Trade-off Theory of Capital Structure 
 
         Source: Myers (1984) 
 
The assumptions of the trade-off theory can be stated as follows: Investors are 
risk-neutral; they are obliged to pay a personal tax rate on income from bonds 
while firms are required to pay a constant marginal tax on their corporate income; 
corporate and personal taxes are based on the end of period wealth; dividends and 
capital gains are also taxed at a constant rate; there exist non-debt tax shields 
which decrease firms’ tax liability; firms which are not able to pay their debts 
faced with a financial distress cost which reduces the firms’ value.  
 
Bradley et al. (1984) summarizes the main predictions of trade-off theory as 
follows: 
 
1) Optimal debt level decreases with increasing cost of financial distress. 
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2) Optimal debt level decreases with increasing non-debt tax shields. 
3) Optimal debt level increases with increasing personal tax rate on equity 
income. 
4) At the optimal debt level, an increase in the marginal bondholder tax 
rate decreases the optimal debt level. 
 
 
2.1.3 Pecking order Theory 
 
In addition to trade-off theory, another theory that has a big impact on the 
literature is pecking order theory. Pecking order theory was initially suggested by 
Donaldson (1961) and modified by Myers and Majluf (1984), based on the works 
about agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), adverse selection model in 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and signaling theory of Ross (1977).  
 
Agency theory is emerged from moral hazard and conflict of interest between 
principal and agent. It suggests that agents of a company have a tendency to take 
actions which are not best for the company because the benefits are higher than 
costs as such costs are shared between shareholders. 
 
Adverse selection is based on the asymmetric information between buyers and 
sellers. When buyers and sellers are able to access different information, “bad” 
products are more likely to be selected. In a setup like Modigliani and Miller 
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(1958), where efficient market hypothesis holds and all of the members of the 
market has a chance to reach same information under equal conditions, there 
would not exist any problem related with asymmetric information and all sources 
would be equally preferable. However, in real world, because of the asymmetric 
information problems, firms prefer to obtain financing from sources where there 
exist lowest amount of information asymmetry problems. 
 
The main idea behind the pecking order theory is that, only the owner of the 
company knows the true value of the firm and its growth opportunities. However, 
an outsider can only guess these values. Therefore, people react suspiciously 
when owner of a firm tries to sell equity. Normally, owner of an overvalued 
company prefers to sell equity while owner of an undervalued company uses 
equity financing only as a last resort. Therefore, the announcement of an equity 
issue will decrease the value of shares of a company (Ross, 1977). On the other 
hand, using retained earnings or riskless debt will not cause any change in the 
value of the shares. 
 
Myers (1984) states that a firm follows a pecking (preference) order if it prefers 
internal financing (retained earnings) to external financing and if it prefers debt to 
equity at external financing. Myers (1984) also indicates that if it is possible, 
using a riskless debt should be equally preferable as internal financing. However, 
if debt is available but risky, it should be placed somewhere between retained 
earnings and equity which actually creates the pecking order. 
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2.2 Capital Structure of SMEs in Several Countries 
 
Ang (1991) indicates that theories of capital structure were not developed with 
thinking SMEs in first place so they may not be directly appropriate for them. 
However, the validity of trade-off theory and pecking order theory for SMEs are 
tested empirically in many countries. In addition to size, there are two main 
factors that differentiate SMEs from large firms (Bhaird and Lucey, 2010). The 
first one is the SME owners’ desire for keeping their independence and control. 
The second one is the fact that SMEs are having more severe information 
asymmetry problems in financing decisions. These differences affect capital 
structure decisions of SMEs mainly in the following ways: In order to keep 
control, SME managers tend to reject external finance, even for projects with 
positive net present values (Holmes and Kent, 1991). Also, because of 
information asymmetry problems, lenders are unwilling to provide finance to 
SMEs. For example, Berger and Udell (1995) show that, small and young firms 
have shorter banking relationships, pay higher interest rates and are more likely to 
pledge collateral to borrow money.  
 
Hughes (1997) compares small businesses with large ones and identifies the 
following differences: 
 
i. SMEs have lower fixed assets - to - total asset ratios; 
ii. SMEs have higher proportion of trade debt to total assets; 
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iii. SMEs have much higher proportion of current liabilities to total assets; 
iv. SMEs are reliant on retained profits to finance their investments; 
v. SMEs are financially more risky. 
 
Hall et al. (2004) mention that there exist differences in factors that affect capital 
structures of SMEs across countries. Several studies examine the factors affecting 
the capital structure of SMEs in several countries. Van der Wijst and Thurik 
(1993) make a panel data analysis on German small firms operating in the retail 
sector and work on average financial data of 27 different shop types for a period 
of 24 years. They find that tangible assets, inventory turnover and return on 
investment have significant effects. Although inventory turnover is not a 
commonly used tool in the literature, it constitutes an important part of assets of 
firms in retail industry. Furthermore, they observe that, non-debt tax shields, 
measured by depreciation expenses, have no significant influence on debt ratios. 
The variables that they use have an influence on maturity structure of debt rather 
than total debt. So, the effects on long term debt and short term debt have a 
tendency to cancel out. They observe that both industry characteristics and time 
specific effects have significant impact on capital structure of firms.  
 
Chittenden et al. (1996) analyze a U.K. database for a sample of both listed and 
unlisted small firms with an emphasis on growth and being quoted in stock 
market. Using OLS regression, they find that tangible assets, profitability, size 
and being listed have significant effects on financial structure of small firms. 
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Growth does not have a significant effect on leverage but combination of rapid 
growth and being unlisted have. They find that collaterals are used by lenders to 
solve information asymmetry problem widely, especially for small unlisted firms. 
Moreover, the importance of collateral decreases with the increase in size. 
Furthermore, long term debts provided to small companies are mostly based on 
collaterals. They conclude that financial barriers to enter stock markets for small 
firms needs to be reduced and innovative solutions are needed to solve agency 
problem between small firms and lenders. 
 
Like Chittenden et al. (1996), Michaelas et al. (1999) also analyze a U.K. database 
for SMEs. Using panel data methodology, they find that size, asset structure, 
profitability, growth, future growth opportunities, age, stock turnover and net 
debtors have significant effect on short term debt and long term debt levels. They 
find that tax rate has an insignificant effect. Moreover, their results indicate that 
average short term debt ratios of SMEs increase during periods of economic 
recession and decrease as economic conditions improve. However, long term debt 
ratio is positively associated with economic growth. 
 
Romano et al. (2000) study factors influencing capital structure decisions of 
family businesses in Australia. They collect primary data with 250 item 
questionnaire, mailed to a random sample of 5000 business owners. Their 
response rate was 29.2%. They analyze the data of in four stages: data screening, a 
principal component analysis, a confirmatory factor analysis and structural 
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equation modeling. They disclose that firm size, age and owners preference for 
maintaining their control of the business has significant effects on debt levels. 
Furthermore, having a formal business plan and owners desire for growth and 
their desire to control are the other factors that influence the capital structure of 
family businesses. According to them, small firms without a formal business plan 
rely on loans from other family members. However, firms in the service industry 
and firms whose owners plan to achieve growth by new product or process 
development are less likely to use family loans. They also report that MM 
propositions are more appropriate for public companies and pecking order 
predictions are in line with the capital structure decisions of family businesses. 
 
Cassar and Holmes (2003) also examine Australian SMEs. Using OLS regression, 
they find that size, profitability, growth of assets and asset tangibility are 
important factors in determining the capital structure of SMEs. Moreover, what is 
different in their study is that, they examine if there is a difference between 
financing and firm characteristics of small firms and relatively larger firms in the 
sample. They divide their sample into two using sample median for total assets. 
They discover that, the effects of these factors on capital structure are 
homogenous across both small and large firm. 
 
Hall et al. (2004) examine the determinants of the capital structures of 4,000 
SMEs from Belgium, Germany, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and 
the UK. They define firms with fewer than 200 employees as SMEs. They test 
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profitability, growth, asset structure, size and age as capital structure 
determinants. Growth is measured by the percentage change in sales turnover in 
previous 3 years and assets structure is measured by the ratio of tangible assets to 
total assets. For the whole sample, they find collateral as the strongest and growth 
as the weakest determinants of the capital structure. Furthermore, they observe 
that the country fits best to pecking order predictions is the UK, followed by 
Spain and Italy. Hence, firms in the UK rely more on their retained earnings and 
need collaterals to obtain external finance more than other countries in their 
sample. 
 
Sogorb-Mira (2005) tests how firm characteristics affect SME capital structure in 
Spain. Their data consists of 6,482 firms over the period between 1994 and 1998. 
Using panel data analysis, he finds that non-debt tax shields and profitability are 
negatively related with leverage while size, assets structure and growth options 
have positive effect on leverage. The results support maturity matching principle. 
That is, Spanish firms are trying to finance their long term assets with long term 
debt and their current assets with short term debt. 
 
Bhaird and Lucey (2010) examine capital structure of Irish SMEs. They 
emphasize the role of personal wealth of the owner especially in the early years of 
a firm. They find that owner’s personal assets, which can be shown as collateral, 
play significant role in capital structure of small firms. They observe that after 
first years, firms rely more on retained profits and short term debt. Owners’ desire 
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to keep control also plays a role in these decisions. They find that asset tangibility 
is positively related with long term debt. Irish firms with more growth options are 
positively associated with external equity and negatively associated with retained 
earnings.  
 
Pindado et al. (2006) investigate the effect of financial distress on the capital 
structure of Portuguese small firm. They estimate models using Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) on a panel data of small Portuguese firms during a 
period of recession. Using GMM they solve the endogeneity problems by using 
instruments. They define financially distressed firms as if they fail to satisfy their 
financial obligations, starting from the first period that financial distress occurs. In 
their regressions they also include lagged debt ratios. To they measure the speed 
of adjustment to target levels.  They find that small firms adjust their debt to target 
levels. However, financially distressed firms act randomly. The coefficients on 
lagged debt ratios for financially distressed firms are found to be not significant, 
probably because they lack the knowledge to handle the distress.  
 
Klapper et al. (2006) analyze SME financing in Poland. The majority of firms in 
their sample operate in service sector. They observe that larger firms generally 
have higher leverage and older firms tend to decrease their debt levels. They 
suggest that age may not be a good proxy for reputation in transition economies 
like Poland. They also find that leverage is positively associated with asset 
tangibility and growth in assets. Information asymmetry problem is observed 
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mostly small firms thus these firms have to rely on more their retained earnings 
and they use external equity only as a last resort.   
 
Heyman et al. (2008) examine capital structures of privately held Belgian firms. 
They conduct panel data methodology and observe that firms having rapid growth 
in their assets and firms with fewer tangible assets have lower debt ratios. They 
find that firms are trying to match the maturity of their assets with the maturity of 
their liabilities. Furthermore, they measure the credit worthiness of firms by a 
short term default risk indicator and they observe that firms having low credit risk 
borrow more long term debt and firms having high credit risk forced to take short 
term debt, as expected. 
 
Degryse et al. (2010) investigate the capital structure of Dutch SMEs. They 
employ a panel data analysis in their investigation. Their results are in accordance 
with pecking order theory. That is, size, asset tangibility, growth of assets and 
growth opportunities are positively associated with leverage. Furthermore, they 
observe that SMEs prefer to use their profits to decrease their debt levels. They 
find that the industry that the firm operates in is also important factor for the 
capital structure of Dutch SMEs. They also support the maturity matching 
principle. 
 
Fan et al. (2010) examine the capital structures of debt maturity choices of 39 
developed and developing countries including United States and Turkey.  They 
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measure the total leverage as the ratio of total debt to market value of the firm. 
Market value of firms is defined as the market value of common equity added by 
book value of preferred stock and total debt. Moreover, they use long term debt to 
total debt ratio as indicator of debt maturity. Turkey and USA are found among 
five countries which have lowest amount of total debt in their capital structures. 
However, when debt maturity is observed, USA is found as the fourth country 
which has highest long term debt ratio while Turkey is the thirty seventh. This 
difference stems from being a developed economy or not. Hence developed 
economies have more long term debt in their capital structure. In order to 
investigate the difference between countries, they use some country specific 
measure like usage of common law, level of corruption, existence of an explicit 
bankruptcy code, existence of deposit insurance. They provide such measures 
from sources including International Country Risk Guide and Corruption 
Perception Index. In general they find that, being a developed economy, common 
law and low level of corruption are associated with lower leverage and higher 
long term debt. Related with USA they report that, ratio of tangible assets to total 
assets, profitability and size is positively and market-to-book ratios of firms are 
negatively related with both leverage and debt maturity.   
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2.3 Capital Structure of Turkish SMEs 
 
Regarding with Turkish SMEs, Korkmaz et al. (2007) analyze capital structure of 
the SMEs listed in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). They examine 37 firms 
over period between 1997 and 2004 using stepwise least squares regression 
technique. They consider firm size, risk, profitability, non-debt tax shields and 
growth rate as the variables of capital structure determinants. They find that 
profitability, firm risk, and non-debt tax shields are the most important factors that 
influence SMEs capital structure. Firm risk is measured by the variability in net 
sales. They observe that an increase in the variability of firm’s assets will lead to 
an increase in the leverage. 
 
Acaravcı and Doğukanlı (2004) examine the factors affecting structure of 
manufacturing firms listed on the ISE. However, they do not focus on SMEs. 
They conduct panel data analysis of 66 firms over a period between 1992 and 
2003. In addition to firm characteristics, they have also test macroeconomic 
indicators such as development of stock markets, development of banking sector, 
change in real GDP, inflation, total government domestic debt stock which are 
uncommon in SME literature. The development of stock market is measured by 
the total market value of the stocks trading in the ISE. The development of 
banking sector is measured by the total amount of credits provided to private 
sector. Both of these measures and domestic debt are scaled by nominal GDP. 
They find that growth rate of total assets, development of banking sector, inflation 
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and corporate tax rate are positively related with leverage. On the other hand, 
profitability is found to be negatively associated with debt ratio as expected. The 
remaining variables are found to be insignificant. 
 
Akkaya and Güler (2007) investigate the capital structure of big sized 
manufacturing company’s trade on the ISE. They use panel data methodology and 
use total debt to total assets, total debt to total equity and short term debt to total 
assets as dependent variables. They find that firm characteristics are more 
important than market characteristics in deciding the maturity of firms debt. Both 
short term debt and long term debt are found to be influenced by similar variables 
such as profitability, assets turnover, growth in sales and assets. Furthermore, they 
find a negative relation between profitability and leverage consistent with pecking 
order theory. Also, the positive relation between assets turnover and total debt is 
in line with free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986). 
 
Yıldız et al. (2009) test the predictions of trade-off theory and pecking order 
theory using a panel data of manufacturing firms listed on the ISE during the 
period between 1998 and 2006. Total debt, short term debt and long term debt 
scaled by equity and used as dependent variables in their regressions. They 
observe a negative relation between profitability and leverage. Moreover, asset 
tangibility is found as insignificantly related with total debt and long term debt 
and have significant negative effects on short term debt. Furthermore, size is 
found as positively associated with total debt and short term debt and asset growth 
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is positively associated with total debt and long term debt. Lastly, tax rate and 
non-debt tax shields are found to be insignificant in explaining capital structure of 
Turkish firms. According to Yıldız et al. (2009), this finding shows that taxes paid 
by companies are very low and they are omitted by firms in deciding their capital 
structures. 
 
In addition to firm characteristics, country specific environmental factors can also 
affect SMEs access to finance. For example, Levy (1993) underlines that, in 
Tanzania, regulatory and tax constraints appear largest for small firms and this 
restricted access to financial services decreases the growth of SMEs. In addition, 
Beck et al. (2005) mention that SMEs that operate in underdeveloped systems, 
which has higher level of corruption, are affected by all obstacles like financing 
problems, legal constraints and corruption more than firms operating in countries 
with a smaller level of corruption. The development in the financial and legal 
systems decreases the corruption and relaxes the constraints on the SMEs.  
 
Hence, the literature examining the capital structure of SMEs in several countries 
support pecking order theory is valid. Moreover, the characteristics of firms, such 
as size, profitability, having tangible assets, growth and growth opportunities are 
factors that determine the choice of financing. In this thesis, I will follow the 
existing literature and test the predictions of the trade-off theory and pecking 
order theory for the SMEs in Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 
Both trade-off theory and pecking order theory are “point of view” theories 
according to Frank and Goyal (2007). That is, they do not give explicit 
mathematical models but they explain the intuition about the relationship between 
capital structure and its determinants. This allows researchers to develop and test 
their hypotheses. Following the literature, in this chapter I will discuss the 
hypotheses that will be tested about the capital structure of Turkish SMEs.  
 
Like in most empirical papers, theoretical results must be interpreted using 
hypotheses constructed from the theoretical effects of firms’ variables. The most 
frequently used variables in the literature to test capital structure of firms are firm 
size, asset tangibility, profitability, growth and growth opportunities. Both trade-
off theory and pecking order theory have some predictions about the impact of 
these variables on capital structure. They can be summarized as follows: 
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  Trade-off theory Pecking order theory 
Size + + 
Asset Tangibility + + 
Profitability + - 
Growth - + 
Growth Opportunities - + 
 
An increase in size will decrease probability of bankruptcy and information 
asymmetry problems. Hence, both pecking order theory and trade-off theory 
predicts that firms’ debt level increase with an increase in size. Moreover, 
collaterals may decrease cost of bankruptcy and give opportunity to lenders to 
assess firms. Therefore, tangible assets are expected to have positive effect on 
debt ratio. Furthermore, pecking order theory expects that firms use their profits to 
decrease their debt levels while trade-off theory expects the opposite since more 
profitable firms have more opportunity to take debt. Additionally, fast growth and 
high growth opportunities are positively associated with debt usage according to 
pecking order theory. However, trade-off theory anticipates that high financial 
distress, resulted from fast growth and high growth opportunities, leads firms to 
decrease their leverage. 
 
 
3.1 Size 
 
One of the main problems faced by SMEs in their debt financing is information 
asymmetry problem. Lenders use size as a proxy to solve this problem. First of 
all, smaller firms find more difficult and costly to solve the information 
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asymmetry problems with lenders. Moreover, lenders also do not prefer to finance 
small firms because most of the data provided by small firms to banks are not 
easily verifiable and needs extra effort to verify. Furthermore, smaller firms have 
limited capital resources and they reach capital at higher costs than relatively 
bigger firms. Transaction costs can also discourage small firms from obtaining 
debt finance since smaller amount of financing cause relatively higher transaction 
costs (Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
 
Size might be also used as a proxy for bankruptcy cost. Another explanation for 
using firm size and as one of the determinants of leverage is the negative relation 
between probability of bankruptcy and firm size. With an increasing firm size, 
cash flows of the firm become less volatile and earnings of the firm become more 
predictable (Degryse et al., 2010). Therefore, financial distress of bankruptcy 
decreases and firms prefer to take more debt. Also from lenders point of view, as 
it is indicated in Berryman (1982), lending to small firms represents a significant 
risk because of the negative relation between firm size and probability of 
insolvency. Both limited management skills and attitude of banks to small firms 
play a role in this negative relation. 
 
Trade-off theory, which balances the benefits of debt and the financial distress of 
bankruptcy, expects size to be positively associated with leverage since 
probability of bankruptcy decreases with size. By this way, firms can take more 
debt. Like trade-off theory, pecking order theory also expects a positive relation 
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between firm size and leverage since information asymmetry problems reduce as 
size increases. 
 
Unlike expectations of trade-off theory and pecking order theory, it is also 
possible to have a negative relation between size and debt. Petit and Singer (1985) 
argue that although it is more costly to provide debt for smaller firms, cost of 
providing equity may be even higher. Therefore, smaller firms might prefer 
having more debt in their capital structure. However, most of the papers in the 
literature find a positive relation between firm size and debt ratio. For example, 
Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993), Chittenden et al. (1996), Jordan et al. (1998), 
Michaelas et al. (1999), Romano et al. (2000),  Cassar and Holmes (2003), 
Pindado et al. (2006), Klapper et al. (2006), Heyman et al. (2008) all find a 
positive relation between size and leverage. Therefore, the first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: Firm size is positively related with debt ratio. 
 
It will be advantageous to evaluate short term debt and long term debt separately 
while analyzing the capital structure and financing of firms. In general, small 
firms have more problems in finding long term debt than short term debt. 
Therefore, long term debt is expected to be positively related with firm size. Due 
to the problems in raising long term debt, small firms tend to use short term debt 
more, so firm size is expected to be negatively related with short term debt. The 
relation between short term debt, long term debt and firm size has been analyzed 
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for SMEs in several countries. Michaelas et al. (1999), Hall et al. (2004) and 
Degryse et al. (2010) find a significantly negative relation between short term 
debt and firm size while effect of size on long term debt is significantly positive. 
Although Bhaird and Lucey (2010) find a positive relation between size and long 
term debt, it is not significant. Cassar and Holmes (2003) show a significantly 
positive relation with long term debt but an insignificant relation with short term 
debt. Hence, I will test the following hypotheses for the relation between size and 
debt usage with different maturities:  
 
H1-1: Firm size is positively related with long term debt. 
H1-2: Firm size is negatively related with short term debt. 
 
 
3.2 Asset Structure (Collateral) 
 
The tangibility of assets is another important determinant for the capital structure 
of firms. The probability of not taking money back from the firms makes banks 
and other lenders more reluctant to provide financing. Although financial policies 
differ across countries, collateral is appreciated by every lender. As Titman and 
Wessels (1988) indicate, firms’ liquidation values increase as firms have more 
assets to show as collateral. Therefore, asset tangibility is expected to be 
positively correlated with debt level. Collaterals decrease the losses faced by 
lenders by increasing the liquidation value of a firm. Pledging firms’ assets as 
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collateral not only decreases the agency cost of debt; but also reduces the adverse 
selection and moral hazard costs (Cassar and Holmes, 2003). Hence, firms having 
assets with high liquidation value face with relatively less problems in debt 
financing. As a result, they are expected to have higher leverage. 
 
In this thesis, I use tangible assets to measure asset structure. Since tangible assets 
reduce the potential bankruptcy costs and credit risk, trade-off theory expects a 
positive association between collateral and leverage. In addition, tangible assets 
help to decrease the problem of information asymmetry, which is the main 
argument of pecking order theory. Thus, not surprisingly, like trade-off theory, 
pecking order theory also expects a positive relation between collateral and 
leverage.  
 
As explained in the literature review, information asymmetry problems are even 
more severe for smaller firms. Smaller firms are not obligated to announce their 
financial statements which make it harder to assess them. Beck et al. (2006) 
indicate that collateral requirements of lenders have a significant constraining 
effect on small firms’ growth. Moreover, large firms are not affected by obstacles 
like collateral requirements, high amount of bank paperwork and bureaucracy, 
limited loanable funds, need for special connections with lenders, accessing long 
term debt etc. However, these obstacles have a significantly negative effect on 
SMEs. Hence, collaterals are very important for SMEs.  
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Jordan et al. (1998) and Michaelas et al. (1999) find a positive relation between 
asset tangibility and debt ratio for U.K. SMEs. Moreover, Cassar and Holmes 
(2003), Klapper et al. (2006), Pindado et al. (2006) and Heyman et al. (2008) also 
observe positive relation between debt ratio and collateral for Australian, Eastern 
European, Portuguese and Belgian SMEs. Therefore, I form the second main 
hypothesis as: 
 
H2: Collateral is positively related with debt ratio. 
 
In addition to total debt, the effect of collaterals on short term debt and long term 
debt is also analyzed separately in the literature. Since lenders prefer collateral to 
assess the firms, it is expected that the long term debt to be positively correlated 
with asset tangibility. Furthermore, as Myers (1977) indicates, the loan maturity is 
correlated with the maturity of the assets used as collateral. Therefore, if the firm 
has long term assets, they are more likely to use long term debt rather than short 
term debt. Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993), Chittenden et al. (1996), Hall et al. 
(2004) and Sogorb-Mira (2005) found that collateral has a significant positive 
relation with long term debt but a significant negative relation with short term 
debt. Additionally, Bhaird and Lucey (2010) indicate a positive relation between 
collateral and long term debt for manufacturing, hotel and service industries 
except for metal manufacturing industry. Hence, two hypotheses regarding to the 
maturity of debt and collateral are stated as: 
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H2-1: Asset structure is positively related with long term debt. 
H2-2: Asset structure is negatively related with short term debt. 
 
 
3.3 Profitability 
 
Trade-off theory expects that firms with more profits have a higher debt ratio. 
According to trade-off theory, firms use debt as a tool to decrease their tax 
liabilities and more profitable firms have more opportunity to obtain debt. 
 
On the other hand, pecking order theory predicts that profitability and leverage are 
negatively related. Myers (1984) explains this relation as follows: More profitable 
firms will need less external finance since retained earnings are the most desirable 
source of financing. Although more profitable firms have fewer problems in 
reaching external finance, they prefer retained earnings since external capital is 
more costly. Almost all of the empirical studies found a negative relation between 
profitability and leverage (see e.g. Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Chittenden et 
al., 1996; Jordan et al., 1998; Coleman and Cohn, 1999; Michaelas et al., 1999; 
Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Pindado et al., 2006; Heyman et al., 2008). Therefore, my 
hypothesis regarding profitability is: 
 
H3: Profitability is negatively related with leverage. 
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Since retained earnings are more desirable than external capital according to 
pecking order theory, profitability is negatively related with both short term debt 
and long term debt. Moreover, SMEs use short term debt more than long term 
debt. So, it can be also expected that profitability has a higher negative impact on 
short term debt than long term debt. The empirical findings also support the 
prediction of pecking order theory. Cassar and Holmes (2003) and Sogorb-Mira 
(2005) show that profitability is negatively related with both long term debt and 
short term debt and it has a greater negative effect on short term debt. Chittenden 
et al. (1996) and Hall et al. (2004) also find the same relations for British and 
European SMEs except the impact of profitability on long term debt is not 
significant. Therefore, my hypotheses about the type of debt usage and 
profitability are stated as follows: 
 
H3-1: Profitability is negatively related with short term debt. 
H3-2: Profitability is negatively related with long term debt. 
H3-3: The impact of profitability on short term debt is higher than that on long 
term debt.  
 
 
3.4 Growth Opportunities 
 
Myers (1977) indicates that agency problems between managers and lenders, 
especially the underinvestment problem, are more severe for firms with more 
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growth opportunities which make these firms to prefer less debt. Also, as growth 
opportunities increase, the financial distress that firm faces increases because they 
have more things to lose. Therefore, trade-off theory predicts that firms with high 
growth opportunities decrease their debt levels. Underinvestment problem occurs 
because firms obtaining debt with high interest rates may have a tendency to 
reject projects with positive net present values.  The equity holders bear the entire 
cost of the project but they may not earn profit because of high interest rates 
(Myers, 1977). Also, Myers (1977) adds that the lenders may not take the 
advantage of growth since they will only get back the amount that they lend. This 
increases the cost of long term debt and encourages firms to use more short term 
debt.  
 
However, pecking order theory predicts the opposite of trade-off theory. In other 
words, it expects leverage is expected to be positively related with growth 
opportunities. According to pecking order theory, growing firms will first try to 
finance their investments through retained earnings. If it is not possible, firms 
with high growth opportunities will use debt to finance their growth. Moreover, 
firms with high growth opportunities can use these growth opportunities to attract 
external finance. Since obtaining short term debt can be more expensive, it is 
expected that growth opportunities lead to a decrease in short term debt and an 
increase in long term debt. 
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There exist several papers in the literature examining the relation between growth 
opportunities and leverage. Mostly, book to market ratio, research and 
development expenses or the relative amount of intangible assets is used as a 
proxy to measure the growth opportunities. Titman and Wessels (1998) use ratio 
of capital expenditure to total assets and research and development expenses over 
sales as indicators of growth. They find a significant and negative relation 
between growth opportunities and leverage. In addition, Barclay et al. (1995) and 
Barclay et al. (2006) report a negative relation between growth opportunities and 
leverage which is consistent with trade-off theory. However, papers analyzing 
SMEs find results in line with pecking order predictions. Michaelas et al. (1999), 
Sogorb-Mira (2005) and Degryse et al. (2010) all report positive relations between 
growth opportunities and leverage. Moreover, Sogorb-Mira (2005) and Degryse et 
al. (2010) observe a significantly negative relation with short term debt and a 
significantly positive relation with long term debt. Therefore I form the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H4: Growth opportunities are positively related with leverage. 
H4-1: Growth opportunities are negatively related with short term debt. 
H4-2: Growth opportunities are positively related with long term debt. 
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3.5 Growth 
 
In addition to growth opportunities, past growth rate also has significant effects on 
the debt ratio. It is important to analyze them separately since past growth rate and 
growth opportunities may not be good indicators of each other (Heyman et al., 
2007). Predictions of trade-off and pecking order theory about past growth are 
similar to their predictions for growth opportunities. It is likely for fast growing 
small firms to have insufficient funds to finance their growth internally. Hence, 
these firms issue debt to finance their growth. Also, considering the problems that 
small firms face in raising long term debt, growth rate is likely to have a higher 
effect on short term debt than long term debt. 
 
Michaelas et al. (1999) find significantly positive relation between growth and for 
long, medium and short term debt maturities. Furthermore, Degryse et al. (2010) 
indicates an insignificant relation with short term debt but significantly positive 
relations with total debt and long term debt. Lastly, Chittenden et al. (1996) report 
positive and significant coefficients for total debt and short term debt. In light of 
these findings, I form the following hypotheses related with growth. 
 
H5: Growth is positively related with total debt. 
H5-1: Growth is positively related with short term debt. 
H5-2: Growth is positively related with long term debt. 
H5-3: The relation of growth is stronger with short term debt than long term debt.  
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Below table summarizes my hypotheses described in this section. 
  
Total Debt Short term debt Long term debt 
Size + - + 
Collateral + - + 
Profitability - - - 
Growth + + + 
Growth Opportunities + - + 
 
Hence, I expect that larger firms, those with higher amount of tangible assets, and 
those with growth opportunities use more debt. Moreover, these firms reduce their 
short term debt levels and prefer long term debt in particular since it is more 
advantageous. More profitable firms are expected to use less external debt since 
retained earnings are the most desired financial sources. Lastly, rapidly growing 
firms are likely to have insufficient internal funds. So, they are expected to use 
external finance, especially short term debt, which is easier to obtain, in the first 
place.    
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
DATA, VARIABLES AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
 
 
4.1 Data  
 
The data used in this thesis is obtained from Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey (CBRT) upon confidential agreements. In order to investigate 
developments in each sector and evaluate behavior of the markets, since 1990, 
CBRT prepares yearly “Company Accounts” with voluntary participation of 
firms. Using these data, CBRT reports the aggregated financial statements of each 
sector.  This dataset includes all industries and firms located in all of cities in 
Turkey. Therefore, it can be evaluated as a valid representative of Turkish 
economy. It includes firm level data of over 8000 firms from non-financial 
sectors. According to European Commission (2009), there exist 2,313,720 SMEs 
in Turkey by 2008. Although, CBRT dataset is the most comprehensive available 
dataset on SMEs, it covers only very small portion of all SMEs in Turkey. 
Financial firms are excluded from the sample because they have different capital 
structures. They classify the firms into 13 main and 162 sub-sectors. Nearly 4000 
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of them are manufacturing firms. In addition to the balance sheet and income 
statement accounts, information about the sector that the firm is operating, the 
number of workers, its foundation date, and its legal form are also provided in the 
dataset. However, financial statements provided by the companies are not audited. 
Companies’ declarations are taken as true in the analysis.  
 
Data that I use in the analysis has cross sectional observations for several years. 
This panel nature of the data encourages me to use panel data methodology to test 
the capital structure theories. The number of firms existing in the data set changes 
year by year which makes the dataset an unbalanced panel. 
 
Hsiao (2007) denotes that there exist several advantages of panel data compared 
to cross-sectional or times series data. Panel data controls firm heterogeneity and 
reduce the collinearity among the variables used in the model (Arellano and 
Bover, 1990). Omitting heterogeneity in the variables causes bias in estimation. 
Furthermore, panel data contains more data points, more degrees of freedom and 
more sample variability than cross sectional data. This provides higher efficiency 
for the estimations. Moreover, panel data have information about both the 
intertemporal dynamics and individuality of entities. So, it is better to identify and 
measure effects which are not easy to detect in cross-section or times series data 
individually (Baltagi, 1995). 
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4.1.1 Sample Selection 
 
The time period between 1998 and 2008 is used in the analysis. The sample 
includes only manufacturing firms. Firms in the service sector including financial 
ones are excluded from the sample. One of the firm classification methods that 
CBRT use is based on the number of workers which is the method that I also 
prefer in this paper.  
 
In this thesis, I analyze the capital structure of Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprises from manufacturing sector. The firms are grouped into two categories 
based on their size measured with the number of workers they have. Companies 
having workers less than or equal to 50 are classified as small firms. If they have 
workers between 51 and 500, they are considered as medium sized firms, as 
grouped by the CBRT.  
 
Firms included in my sample have less than 500 workers during the time period 
between 1997 and 2008. However, observations from 1997 are not included in the 
analysis because they are used to calculate growth variable. While investigating 
data, I observe that there exists high number of firms having abnormal growth in 
their total assets (more than 400% in a year). Since the data is entered manually, 
there were some entry mistakes in the data. I try to clean them. Originally, there 
were 49,198 observations including 4,011 observations from big (more than 500 
workers) companies. First, I delete observations of big companies. Second, since 
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it is not known at which month of the year the firm was established, the financial 
statements, mainly income statements may not cover the whole year. If the firm 
was established in that year, it was excluded from the sample because its profit 
may not cover the whole year. With this elimination, 167 observations were lost. 
Third, if the firm has negative age or was established before the Republic of 
Turkey was established, they were excluded. Fourth, the yearly growth rate in 
number of workers, total assets and net sales were calculated and compared over 
the years. Those with inconsistent values are excluded from the sample as well. If 
the number of workers in a single year is missing, I fill the missing year with the 
average of one year before and after. After the cleaning procedure, there were 
44,029 observations.  
 
My data set contains 4003 firms per year on average and 44,029 observations in 
total. The yearly distribution of the number of firms, and their distribution over 14 
sub-sectors of manufacturing are given for all firms and for small and medium 
sized enterprises in Table 1. Percentage that each sector constitutes in total sample 
by year is also presented in Table 1. Total number of firms in data has an upward 
trend between 1998 and 2002 and it increases every year in that period except 
2001. On the other hand, between 2002 and 2008 it discloses a downward trend. 
Firms operating in textile and textile products industry constitutes biggest portion 
of the sample (23.4%). It is followed by firms in food products, beverages and 
tobacco industry (16.9%). On the other hand, the firms in coke, refined petroleum 
products and nuclear fuel industry is the smallest, it represents only the 0.3% of 
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the sample. Small and medium firms seem to be evenly distributed in the total 
sample. That is, 46% of full sample is small firms and remaining 54% is medium 
sized firms. 
 
 
Table 1 – Distribution of firms by year and sector 
 
Panel A             
Year  All Firms Percentage Small Firms Percentage Medium Firms Percentage 
1998 3,265 7.4% 1,413 7.0%                     1,852  7.7% 
1999 3,671 8.3% 1,794 8.9%                     1,877  7.9% 
2000 3,929 8.9% 1,942 9.6%                     1,987  8.3% 
2001 3,916 8.9% 1,932 9.6%                     1,984  8.3% 
2002 4,480 10.2% 2,300 11.4%                     2,180  9.1% 
2003 4,246 9.6% 2,093 10.4%                     2,153  9.0% 
2004 4,301 9.8% 1,913 9.5%                     2,388  10.0% 
2005 4,128 9.4% 1,817 9.0%                     2,311  9.7% 
2006 3,933 8.9% 1,554 7.7%                     2,379  10.0% 
2007 4,286 9.7% 1,808 9.0%                     2,478  10.4% 
2008 3,874 8.8% 1,566 7.8%                     2,308  9.7% 
Total 44,029 100.0% 20,132 100.0%                   23,897  100.0% 
 
 
 43 
 
Table 1 – cont’d 
 
Panel B             
Industry All Firms Percentage Small Percentage Medium Percentage 
DA 7,460 16.9% 4,340 21.6%                 3,120  13.1% 
DB 10,286 23.4% 3,373 16.8%                 6,913  28.9% 
DC 844 1.9% 442 2.2%                    402  1.7% 
DD 1,182 2.7% 776 3.9%                    406  1.7% 
DE 1,820 4.1% 833 4.1%                    987  4.1% 
DF 119 0.3% 86 0.4%                      33  0.1% 
DG 2,816 6.4% 1,579 7.8%                 1,237  5.2% 
DH 2,717 6.2% 1,381 6.9%                 1,336  5.6% 
DI 2,965 6.7% 1,098 5.5%                 1,867  7.8% 
DJ 4,613 10.5% 2,079 10.3%                 2,534  10.6% 
DK 3,141 7.1% 1,662 8.3%                 1,479  6.2% 
DL 1,889 4.3% 723 3.6%                 1,166  4.9% 
DM 2,507 5.7% 864 4.3%                 1,643  6.9% 
DN 1,670 3.8% 896 4.5%                    774  3.2% 
Total 44,029 100.0% 20,132 100.0%               23,897  100.0% 
Where: DA: manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco, DB: manufacture of textile and textile products, DC: manufacture of leather and leather 
products, DD: manufacture of wood and wood products, DE: manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products publishing and printing, DF: manufacture of coke, 
refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel, DG: manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibers, DH: manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products, DI: manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products, DJ: manufacture of basic metals, DK: manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and  equipment, DL: manufacture of electrical and optical equipment, DM: manufacture of transport equipment, DN: manufacturing nowhere else 
classified (n.e.c.) 
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4.2 Variables 
 
In the previous section, I form hypotheses related with the capital structure of 
SMEs which are needed to be evaluated through some measures. Although in the 
capital structure theory, there does not exist a specific way to analyze its 
determinants, I can use previous empirical studies to determine our dependent and 
independent variables. All of the variables I use in this thesis are based on the 
book values since market values for SMEs are not known and SME managers take 
capital structure decisions according to book values.  
 
I use several variables to measure the capital structure of SMEs. The first one is 
the total debt ratio, calculated by dividing total debt to total assets. Previous 
studies emphasize that analyzing the capital structure by using only total debt ratio 
may suppress some possible important findings (Chittenden et al., 1996; 
Michaelas et al., 1999; Sogorb-Mira, 2005; Degryse et al., 2010). Therefore in 
addition to total debt ratio, I also include long term debt ratio and short term debt 
ratio, defined in a similar way. Since SMEs use short-term debt rather than long-
term debt, I also use the ratio of short term trade credits to total assets and short-
term bank credits to total assets ratios as indicators of short-term debt.  
 
The following explanatory variables as determinants of capital structure in the 
analysis: 
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• The most common tool in the literature to measure firm size is the natural 
logarithm of adjusted total assets. Taking natural logarithm aims to control 
a possible non-linearity in the data and consequent problem of 
heteroskedasticity. The adjusted values of total assets are the values at the 
end of 2008. They are calculated using producer price index (PPI) 
obtained from Turkish Statistical Institute. I use 2003 based PPI numbers. 
The PPI values before 2003 are projected according to the changes in the 
1994 based wholesale price index.  
 
• Tangible assets are used to measure the asset structure of a firm. It is 
calculated by the ratio of the tangible assets to total assets. 
 
• Profitability is measured by the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) to total assets. EBIT is the most commonly used measure in the 
literature to measure profitability. In the literature, depreciation and 
amortization expenses are also used to calculate operating income. 
Because of the unavailability of depreciation expenses, it is not included in 
the operating income calculations. 
 
• The growth opportunities are proxied with the ratio of intangible assets to 
total assets. This variable is commonly used in the literature as an 
indicator for growth opportunities. Research and development expenses, 
brand names, and goodwill of the company are evaluated as intangible 
assets of a company. 
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• Growth is calculated as the percentage change in the firm’s assets since 
last year. 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables for all 
firms. Average total liabilities amount to 61% of total assets. When it is 
partitioned as short term liabilities and long term liabilities, it is seen that Turkish 
SMEs use much more short term liabilities (51.8% of total assets) than long term 
liabilities (9.2% of total assets).  
 
Table 3 and Table 4 report descriptive statistics for small and medium firms. The 
average debt ratios of small and medium sized firms are 62.1% and 60.1% 
respectively. Although small firms have higher total debt ratio, medium firms use 
more long term debt than small firms in their capital structure. Medium firms have 
more tangible assets and they are more profitable. But small firms experience a 
higher growth rate. Moreover, medium firms use more bank debt since 38% of 
total debt of small firms is constituted by bank debts while this number is 46% for 
medium sized firms. 
 
Table 5 presents yearly means of the variables for all SMEs. Although short term 
liabilities are preferred by companies, it has a decreasing trend while the usage of 
long term liabilities show significant increase during the analysis period. Increase 
in the long term debt usage can be explained by the decrease in interest rates 
during the analysis period. Together with economic growth, firms issue debt with 
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longer maturities in more advantageous conditions. Moreover, intangible assets 
exhibit a positive trend which shows that Turkish firms started to spend more on 
their research and development. In crisis year, 2001, average growth rate of the 
firms found to be negative and after the crisis period firms experienced very high 
growth rates. 
 
Compared to Dutch SMEs, 80% of their liabilities are formed by long term debt 
(Degryse et al., 2010); Turkish SMEs use less long-term debt. However, maturity 
structure of Turkish SMEs is similar to SMEs in other countries since SMEs in 
several countries have much higher short term debt ratios than long term debt 
ratios (Michaelas et al., 1999; Klapper et al., 2002; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Hall 
et al., 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Furthermore, SMEs use more trade credit than 
bank loans as observed in Australia (Cassar and Holmes, 2003). Bank financing 
amounts only to 36.5% of total debt that SMEs have. Turkish SMEs have much 
more tangible assets (29%) compared to intangible assets (2%) which are in 
parallel with the asset structures of SMEs in other countries. For example, 
tangible and intangible assets constitute 49% and 2% of Dutch SMEs total assets 
respectively (Degryse et al., 2010). Likewise, 35% and 1% are the tangible and 
intangible asset ratios for British case analyzed by Michaelas et al. (1999). 
 
The correlation coefficients between the variables are presented in Table 6. The 
correlations between independent variables are not very high; they may not cause 
multicollinearity problems in the regressions. The highest correlation coefficient 
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is obtained between size and tangible assets. Although profitability is positively 
related with size, it is found to be negatively related with tangible assets and 
intangible assets.  
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis for All SMEs 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Median Maximum Minimum 
Total Debt   61.0% 28.8% 61.5% 466.9% 0.0% 
Short term debt  51.8% 28.2% 50.5% 459.7% 0.0% 
Short term bank debt  17.9% 19.2% 12.7% 348.6% 0.0% 
Short term trade debt  21.5% 18.2% 16.9% 248.4% 0.0% 
Long term debt   9.2% 17.0% 0.6% 404.6% 0.0% 
Long term bank debt  5.9% 13.9% 0.0% 315.3% 0.0% 
Long term trade debt  0.7% 4.3% 0.0% 127.5% 0.0% 
Size  6.87 0.64 6.88 9.15 4.36 
Tangible assets  27% 20% 24% 100% 0% 
ROA  10% 16% 8% 505% -733% 
Intangible assets  2% 5% 0% 81% 0% 
Growth   17% 47% 8% 813% -94% 
Total Debt: total debt/total assets; Short term debt: short term debt/total assets; Short term bank debt: short term bank 
debt/total assets; Short term trade debt: short term trade debt/total assets; Long term debt: long term debt/total assets; 
Long term bank debt: long term bank debt/total assets; Long term trade debt: long term trade debt/total assets;  Size: 
natural logarithm of total assets; Tangible assets: tangible fixed assets/total assets; ROA: EBIT/total assets; 
Intangible assets: intangible assets/total assets; Growth: (total assets(t) - total assets(t-1))/total assets(t-1) 
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Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis for Small Firms 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Median Maximum Minimum 
Total Debt   62.1% 29.4% 63.2% 376.5% 0.0% 
Short term debt  53.9% 29.8% 53.4% 376.5% 0.0% 
Short term bank debt 16.9% 19.4% 10.8% 283.9% 0.0% 
Short term trade credit 22.6% 20.0% 17.5% 213.0% 0.0% 
Long term debt  8.1% 16.8% 0.0% 281.4% 0.0% 
Long term bank debt 6.8% 14.6% 0.0% 243.8% 0.0% 
Long term trade credit 0.9% 5.3% 0.0% 127.5% 0.0% 
Size  6.45 0.53 6.46 8.78 4.36 
Tangible assets  25% 21% 20% 100% 0% 
ROA  9% 16% 7% 505% -369% 
Intangible assets 2% 5% 0% 73% 0% 
Growth   18% 54% 8% 813% -91% 
Total Assets (adj.)  20,800,657 45,992,854 7,601,004 1,422,960,303 22,872 
 
Total Debt: total debt/total assets; Short term debt: short term debt/total assets; Short term bank debt: short term bank 
debt/total assets; Short term trade debt: short term trade debt/total assets Long term debt: long term debt/total assets; 
Long term bank debt: long term bank debt/total assets; Long term trade debt: long term trade debt/total assets  Size: 
natural logarithm of total assets; Tangible assets: tangible fixed assets/total assets; ROA: EBIT/total assets; Intangible 
assets: intangible assets/total assets; Growth: (total assets(t) - total assets(t-1))/total assets(t-1) 
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Table 4 - Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis for Medium Firms 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Median Maximum Minimum 
Total Debt   60.1% 28.2% 60.3% 466.9% 0.3% 
Short term debt  50.0% 26.7% 48.5% 459.7% 0.0% 
Short term bank debt  18.6% 18.9% 14.0% 348.6% 0.0% 
Short term trade debt  20.6% 16.6% 16.6% 248.4% 0.0% 
Long term debt  10.1% 17.2% 2.4% 404.6% 0.0% 
Long term bank debt  9.2% 16.5% 1.5% 315.3% 0.0% 
Long term trade debt   1.3% 5.4% 0.0% 102.7% 0.0% 
Size  7.22 0.49 7.21 9.15 4.76 
Tangible assets  29% 19% 26% 100% 0% 
ROA  10% 16% 8% 359% -733% 
Intangible assets  2% 5% 0% 81% 0% 
Growth   15% 40% 8% 645% -94% 
 
Total Debt: total debt/total assets; Short term debt: short term debt/total assets; Short term bank debt: short term bank 
debt/total assets; Short term trade debt: short term trade debt/total assets Long term debt: long term debt/total assets; 
Long term bank debt: long term bank debt/total assets; Long term trade debt: long term trade debt/total assets  Size: 
natural logarithm of total assets; Tangible assets: tangible fixed assets/total assets; ROA: EBIT/total assets; Intangible 
assets: intangible assets/total assets; Growth: (total assets(t) - total assets(t-1))/total assets(t-1) 
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Table 5 - Mean values of Variables on a Yearly Basis for all SMEs 
 
Year Total Debt Short Term Debt Long Term Debt Size (log) Tangible as. ROA Intangible as. Growth 
         
1998 62.4% 54.1% 8.4% 6.76 27.5% 17.1% 0.9% 18.3% 
1999 65.0% 56.5% 8.4% 6.72 26.2% 14.7% 0.9% 8.7% 
2000 64.9% 56.8% 8.1% 6.74 25.9% 11.4% 0.8% 19.5% 
2001 65.7% 56.8% 8.9% 6.67 24.7% 16.8% 0.9% -11.0% 
2002 63.1% 54.5% 8.7% 6.69 25.2% 11.6% 0.8% 24.9% 
2003 61.5% 53.1% 8.4% 6.78 26.3% 8.6% 1.0% 28.2% 
2004 55.9% 48.1% 7.8% 6.90 30.5% 5.9% 1.8% 33.9% 
2005 57.0% 48.4% 8.6% 6.96 29.4% 5.4% 2.2% 20.6% 
2006 58.3% 48.5% 9.8% 7.06 27.9% 7.8% 2.7% 12.5% 
2007 58.2% 47.2% 11.0% 7.10 27.8% 7.2% 3.4% 11.9% 
2008 60.1% 47.1% 12.9% 7.16 28.0% 6.0% 3.5% 13.0% 
         
Total 61.0% 51.8% 9.2% 6.871 27.2% 5.8% 1.9% 16.8% 
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Table 6 – Correlation Coefficients between Variables 
 
  Total Debt 
Short term 
debt 
Long term 
debt Size Tangible as. Intangible as. ROA 
Total Debt 
  
Short term debt 0.822 
(0.000) 
Long term debt 0.327 -0.270 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.069 -0.165 0.158 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangible as. -0.221 -0.329 0.173 0.144 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intangible as. 0.071 -0.010 0.135 0.033 -0.074 
(0.000) (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.190 -0.133 -0.102 0.010 -0.136 -0.066 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth 0.051 0.037 0.026 0.062 0.000 0.020 0.022 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.952) (0.000) (0.000) 
(p-values associated with the correlations are given in 
paranthesis) 
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4.3 Econometric Model 
 
The panel data methods are used to test the hypotheses similar to other studies 
examining capital structure of SMEs. A general panel data model can be 
represented as follows:  
 
,it it ity x vα β′= + +                                                                       (4.1) 
 
where i=1,…,N representing individual firms, t=1,…,T representing years and xit 
is the matrix of explanatory variables. As it is seen from this expression, in static 
panel data regression, the intercept,α , and the slope coefficients, β , do not 
change across individuals and time periods. 
 
Panel data allows analyzing firm/sector specific or time specific effects in the 
regression. An important issue to consider at this point is type of the individual 
effects. They can be evaluated as either ‘fixed effects’ or ‘random effects’. The 
main difference between the fixed effects model and random effects model is the 
role of the dummy variables. In the fixed effects model, dummy variables are 
considered as a part of the intercept term and in random effects model they 
operate as error terms. In the analysis, fixed effects model is used. According to 
the Hausman test results given in Table 7, fixed effects model should be preferred 
to random effects model. The null hypothesis that the individual effects are 
uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model is rejected at 1% significance 
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level. Fixed effects model should be chosen since random effects model will 
produce biased estimates because one of the Gauss-Markov assumptions will be 
violated.  
 
Table 7 – Hausman test results 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                 χ2 (15) = (b-B)'[(Vb-VB)(-1)](b-B) 
                               =      478.93 
           Prob > χ2     =      0.0000 
 
Fixed effects model is more appropriate for my empirical analysis for another 
reason as well. With individual specific intercept terms, fixed effects model has 
the ability to capture many firm specific effects that are not controlled in the 
model but makes a small firm different from other firms. For example, although 
Berger and Udell (2006) show that the ability of an SME owner have significant 
effects on the firm performance and its financing decisions, we cannot control this 
ability in the analysis without using fixed effects.  
 
The fixed effects model, in general, can be denoted as follows: 
 
( )it i it ity u x vα β′= + + + ,                                                             (4.2) 
 
where error terms are independent identically distributed and iu  represents the 
individual specific effect which is denoted as ‘fixed effects’. Fixed effect models 
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examine the group differences in intercepts while assuming to have same slopes 
and constant variance across subjects. 
 
Two main estimation methods exist in the presence of different intercept terms for 
groups. The first way is the least squares dummy variable approach which puts a 
dummy variable for each individual term. By this way, each individual can have a 
different intercept and the OLS including all these dummies will give the 
estimation results. The regression equation with dummy variables can be shown 
with the following equation: 
 
1
,      i 1,...,N and t 1,...,T ,
N
it j ij it it
j
y D x vα β
=
′= + + = =∑                 (4.3) 
 
where Dij is a dummy variable indicating ith firm or ith industry and is equal to 1 if 
i=j and 0 elsewhere. β , is called as least square dummy variable estimator. 
Computationally, it is difficult to estimate an equation like this because it contains 
many dummy variables considering the number of firms in the data. Therefore, 
the second method is used. This method is the within effect model which subtracts 
the individual means from each observation. The mean of the observations for ith 
individual or ith sector over the whole time period is given with the following 
equation: 
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,      i 1,...N.i i i iy x vα β= + + =                                                     
(4.4) 
Subtracting equation 4.4 from the fixed effects equation gives the within effect 
equation: 
 
( ) ' ( ),      i 1,...N and t 1,...T.it i it i it iy y x x v vβ− = − + − = =          (4.5) 
 
As a result, the intercept term has been eliminated. OLS estimation for β, which is 
called the within estimator, produces the fixed effects estimator. 
 
Equation 4.5 captures the firm or industry specific effects but fails to examine 
time specific effects. In order to capture time specific effects also, I put a dummy 
variable for each year in the analysis, which is given in equation 4.7.   
 
1
( ) ' ( )
T
it i t it it i it i
t
y y D x x v vα β
=
− = + − + −∑                                   (4.7) 
 
where i=1,…N and t=1,…T. Most studies in the literature use only firm or 
industry fixed effects in their regressions. Both data unavailability and economic 
nature of the countries analyzed play role in their model choice. Considering the 
economic instability of Turkey, time effects are also included in the model. 
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Two-way fixed effects model is estimated for all SMEs. I also test the equality of 
means of debt ratios for small-sized and medium-sized firms using t-test. Table 8 
gives the results for these tests. Although their mean total debt ratios are not 
statistically significantly different, there exist significant differences between the 
small and medium sized firms in terms of their mean short term debt ratio and 
long term debt ratio at 5 percent significance level. Therefore, the hypotheses are 
also tested for two types of firms separately. 
 
Table 8 – T-tests for the equality of means of debt ratios for small sized and 
medium sized firms 
 
Small Firms Medium Firms t value Pr > |t| 
Total Debt 62.10% 60.10% -1.43 0.168 
Short term debt 53.90% 50.00% -2.13 0.045 
Long term debt 8.10% 10.10% 2.58 0.021 
 
To sum up, I conduct two way fixed effects regressions on my sample. The first 
set of regressions analyzes firm and year fixed effects. The second one examines 
sector and year fixed effects. Moreover, in addition to analyzing full sample, I 
also investigate small and medium size firms separately and compare the results. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
 
Two regression models are estimated. The first one includes firm and year fixed 
effects. In the second one, firm fixed effects are replaced with sector fixed effects. 
Then, small and medium sized evaluated separately. For each regression, the 
hypotheses are evaluated and compared with earlier studies in the literature. The 
first section discusses the estimation results of the full sample. The results for 
small and medium firms individually discussed in next two sections. Then, section 
5.3 presents some robustness checks. 
 
 
5.1 Results with all SMEs 
 
 
5.1.1 Firm and Year Fixed Effects 
 
The firm fixed effects regression results with and without year dummies are given 
in Panel A and Panel B of Table 9. Adding year dummy variables increases 
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adjusted R2 from 0.63 to 0.66 in total debt regressions. The coefficients on eight 
out of ten years are found to be significant at 5% level. F-test is used to test 
whether there is a significant year effect. The null hypothesis that the coefficients 
on all year dummy variables equal to zero is rejected in favor of fixed time effect. 
 
Table 9 - The results of the Fixed effects Model for all SMEs 
Panel A - Only firm fixed effects without year effects 
 
Total Debt Short term debt Long term debt 
Variable Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic 
Size -0.040 -7.05 -0.078 -14.12 0.038 10.10 
Tangible as. -0.245 -23.56 -0.340 -33.37 0.095 13.60 
ROA -0.326 -41.11 -0.289 -37.26 -0.037 -6.89 
Intangible as. 0.033 1.04 -0.319 -10.40 0.352 16.73 
Growth 0.032 13.04   0.030 12.33   0.002 1.43 
Adj. R2 0.63 0.62 0.52 
F - stat. 445.88 523.46 147.32 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
The first column of Table 9 gives the results for total debt. The second and the 
third columns report the regression results for short term debt and long term debt, 
respectively. In all regressions, all of the coefficients are statistically significant 
except growth coefficient in long term and a few year dummies. Besides, F tests 
for the models emphasize that models are statistically significant. 
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Table 9 - The results of the Fixed effects Model for all SMEs 
 
Panel B - The results of two-way fixed effects (firm and year) model 
 
Total Debt Short term debt Long term debt 
Variable Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic 
Size 0.109 16.18 0.039 5.83 0.070 14.96 
Tangible as. -0.218 -21.50 -0.324 -32.13 0.106 15.07 
ROA -0.422 -53.32 -0.363 -46.06 -0.060 -10.81 
Intangible as. 0.180 5.92 -0.201 -6.63 0.381 18.03 
Growth 0.023 9.02 0.021 8.26 0.002 1.16 
y98 0.148 23.10 0.129 20.19 0.019 4.36 
y99 0.147 24.50 0.125 20.84 0.023 5.43 
y00 0.122 21.58 0.115 20.34 0.007 1.94 
y01 0.175 31.70 0.142 25.74 0.034 8.79 
y02 0.104 20.58 0.086 17.10 0.019 5.14 
y03 0.062 13.34 0.055 11.88 0.007 2.20 
y04 -0.004 -0.86 0.011 2.44 -0.015 -4.74 
y05 -0.001 -0.15 0.012 2.94 -0.013 -4.42 
y06 0.010 2.36 0.017 4.15 -0.007 -2.54 
y07 -0.010 -2.50   0.000 0.00   -0.010 3.59 
Adj. R2 0.66 0.64 0.53 
F - stat. 308.93 272.16 69.89 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
F - test results for year fixed effects 
Hypothesis: y98=y99=…=y07=0. 
  
Total 
Debt Short term debt Long term debt 
F(10, 26851) 222.11 133.59 30.37 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Coefficient on size variable in two-way fixed effects model shows that firm size 
has a positive effect on the total debt ratio. In other words, larger firms have 
higher leverage (H1). Thus, H1 is supported. When log size increases one 
standard deviation, total debt ratio increases by 0.07 (0.639 x 0.109). This positive 
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relation between firm size and debt suggests that lenders are using size as an 
indicator for the quality of firm, may be to reduce information asymmetry 
problems. It might indicate that the smaller firms may have higher financial 
barriers to reach external finance or they might demand to use less external funds. 
Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993), Chittenden et al. (1996), Michaelas et al. (1999) 
Romano et al. (2000), Cassar and Holmes (2003), Pindado et al. (2006), Klapper 
et al. (2006), and Heyman et al. (2008) also report a positive relation between size 
and leverage. 
 
In general small firms have much more problems in raising long term debt than 
short term debt. Thus, when short term debt and long term debt are examined 
separately, I expect size to be positively related with long term debt (H1-1) and 
negatively related with short term debt (H1-2). A significantly positive coefficient 
on size is found in both short term debt and long term debt regressions. Therefore 
H1-1 is supported but H1-2 is rejected. So, an increase in the size also increases 
not only the usage of long term debt but also short term debt. A possible 
explanation for finding a positive relation between short term debt and size might 
be the underdeveloped financial system in Turkey. That is, even raising short term 
debt may be hard and costly for Turkish SMEs and lenders may be using total 
assets not only to give long-term loans but also short-term loans. This finding 
suggests that Turkish SMEs are more dependent on retained earnings than SMEs 
operating in other countries. However, the coefficient on size in long term debt 
regression is 1.8 times higher than that in short term debt regression. This points 
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out that, as a firm gets larger, it relies more on long term debt financing. Several 
papers find results that are in line with my findings (see for example Michaelas et 
al., 1999, Hall et al., 2004 and Degryse et al., 2010).  
 
It is known that banks are reluctant to provide loans to small firms (Beck et al., 
2011). So, SMEs may use tangible assets as collaterals to decrease the information 
asymmetry. I find that there exists a significantly negative relation between 
tangible assets and leverage. This finding is different from our hypothesis (H2) 
that expects asset structure to be positively associated with leverage. An 
explanation for this result can be obtained by analyzing the effect of asset 
structure on long term debt and short term debt given below. 
 
The sign of the coefficient on asset structure variable (tangible assets-to-total 
assets ratio) changes depending on whether short-term debt or long-term debt is 
estimated. It is found that one standard deviation increase in tangible assets 
decreases short term debt ratio by 0.064 (0.199 x -0.324) points, while same 
change implies a 0.021 (0.199 x 0.106) points increase in long term debt ratio. 
H2-1 and H2-2 expect asset structure to be negatively related with short term debt 
and positively related with long term debt, respectively. So, the results support 
these hypotheses. Hence, the negative effect of tangible assets on total debt ratio 
can be explained by the larger proportion of short term debt over long term debt in 
the debt structure of Turkish SMEs.  
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The amount of collaterals is positively associated with the long term debt ratio. 
This result also provides support to maturity matching principle, i.e., firms are 
matching the durations of their assets and liabilities. Hence, Turkish SMEs do not 
behave different from SMEs in other countries since this principle is also 
observed in my analyses (see for example Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993, 
Chittenden et al., 1996, Jordan et al., 1998, Michaelas et al., 1999, Hall et al., 
2004, Sogorb-Mira, 2005, Cassar and Holmes, 2003, Klapper et al., 2006, 
Pindado et al., 2006 and Heyman et al., 2008). 
 
A negative coefficient on profitability is obtained in total debt regression, 
supporting H3. This finding is consistent with the pecking order theory. Pecking 
order theory expects more profitable firms to use less external finance since 
external finance is more costly. Financial source with the lowest degree of 
asymmetric information is the most desirable one. Consequently, small firms 
prefer retained earnings in the first place to finance their growth. Like total debt, 
short term debt and long term debt are also found to be negatively related with 
profitability. Therefore, both H3-1 and H3-2 are supported. Moreover, H3-3 
expects that profitability to have a greater effect on short term debt than long term 
debt. So, H3-3 is also supported. These results are consistent with the previous 
papers of Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993), Chittenden et al. (1996), Sogorb-Mira 
(2005), Degryse et al. (2010). On the other hand, Michaelas et al. (1999) find that 
for British SMEs profitability has a larger negative effect on long term debt which 
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means that they prefer to use their profits to repay their long term debt 
obligations. 
  
H4 expects that an increase in growth opportunities also increases total debt.  My 
estimations support H4. When intangible assets increase one standard deviation, 
total debt ratio increases by 0.01 (0.052 x 0.18). Hence, if intangible assets-to-
total assets ratio increases from 2% to 7.6%, total debt ratio is expected to 
increase from 61% to 62%. Similarly, short-term debt ratio will decrease from 
51.8% to 50.7% and long-term debt ratio will increase from 9.2% to 11.3%. The 
positive effect of growth opportunities on total debt can be explained by the 
increase in the long term debt ratio since its effect on short term debt is negative. 
This provides support for H4-1 and H4-2. Like collaterals, SMEs use their growth 
opportunities to secure or obtain long term. So, SMEs with high growth 
opportunities finance their future growth with long term debt. Results found by 
Michaelas et al. (1999), Sogorb-Mira (2005) and Degryse et al. (2010) are in 
accordance with the findings for Turkish SMEs. 
 
The coefficients of growth variable are found to be positive for total debt and 
short term debt regressions. These results are in line with pecking order 
predictions. Firms having a high growth rate are more likely to have insufficient 
funds to finance their growth internally. Therefore, these firms issue debt to 
finance their growth which is more preferable than issuing equity. Furthermore, 
since short term debt is easier to obtain, SMEs are expected to use short term debt 
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more than long term debt. The estimation results also show that the coefficient on 
growth rate in short-term debt regression is 10.5 times higher than that in long-
term debt regression. These results support the hypotheses related with growth as 
well (H5, H5-1, H5-2 and H5-3). 
 
In addition to hypotheses, another important point in the results that need attention 
is the year dummies. The analysis covers 11 years between 1998 and 2008. Last 
year is taken as a reference year. In the total debt regression, with the exception of 
2004, 2005 and 2007, SMEs have significantly higher total debt ratio than 2008. 
Furthermore, between 1998 and 2001, average total debt level has an upward 
trend and reaches its maximum in 2001. This result is not surprising because 2001 
is the year when banking crisis took place in Turkey. The results suggest that high 
proportion of this excess debt is constituted by short term debt. For example in 
2001, this ratio was 81% (0.142 / 0.175). Between 2001 and 2004, the year 
dummy variables exhibit a highly negative trend. This might be the result of 2001 
crisis. The coefficients of short term bank debt and trade credits are also in line 
with short term debt. Figure 2 plots the year coefficients and percentage change in 
real gross domestic product (GDP) of Turkey during the analyzed period. It is 
seen that there is a negative relation between debt ratios and GDP growth. The 
correlation coefficients between change in GDP and the coefficients on dummy 
variables year dummies also confirm the negative relation. That is, correlations 
between GDP growth and total, short term and long term debt ratios are -0.78, -
0.75 and -0.84 respectively. This result suggests that as economy gets better, debt 
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ratios of SMEs decrease. Considering the decline in the profitability ratios over 
the years, these results indicate that owners prefer to invest more equity in their 
firms. 
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Figure 2 - Coefficients on Year Dummy Variables and Change in GDP 
 
 
 
Coefficients on year dummy variables and change in GDP
Total Debt
Short Term Debt
Long Term Debt
% Change in GDP
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5.1.2 Sector and Year fixed Effects 
 
In the previous section, I show that firm characteristics of SMEs affect their 
capital structure. In this section, I analyze whether differences exist across 
industries or not. 
 
Table 10 shows the results of sector and year fixed effects regressions for total 
debt, short term debt and long term debt with the estimated coefficients on 
different sectors. The base sector group for regressions with sector fixed effects is 
the other manufacturing sector that is not classified anywhere. Only 4 out of 14 
sub-sectors have significantly different total debt ratios from the base group. 
Adjusted R2 values of regressions with sector fixed effects are lower than the ones 
with firm fixed effects (0.66, 0.64, 0.53 vs. 0.14, 0.19, 0.08). This difference can 
be explained by the unique characteristics of each SME since the omitted 
characteristics of firms, such as risk attitude of managers or their management 
abilities are also controlled in the firm fixed effects model. As Berger and Udell 
(2006) indicate, management capabilities of SME owners have significant effects 
on the performance of SMEs.  
 
The estimations with sector effects cause only two significant changes in the 
coefficients compared to the estimations with firm effects. The coefficient on size 
in total debt regression turned out to be insignificant whereas H1 is supported in 
the firm fixed effects regressions. Furthermore, size coefficient in short term 
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regression is negative. Therefore, H1-2 is accepted while it is not supported with 
firm effects. The sector which has the highest debt ratio is found to be 
“manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco”. 
 
Table 10 - Results of two-way fixed effects (sector and year) model 
 
Total Debt Short term debt Long term debt 
Variable Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic 
Size -0.003 -1.24 -0.042 -18.02 0.039 25.76 
Tangible as. -0.346 -44.05 -0.485 -65.62 0.139 29.02 
ROA -0.514 -52.57 -0.416 -45.16 -0.099 -16.54 
Intangible as. 0.322 10.96 -0.118 -4.25 0.44 24.53 
Growth 0.051 16.02 0.041 13.51 0.011 5.43 
s1 0.022 2.68 0.029 3.65 -0.006 -1.24 
s2 0.005 0.65 0.017 2.25 -0.012 -2.4 
s3 -0.077 -5.98 -0.052 -4.3 -0.025 3.18 
s4 0.002 0.18 -0.008 -0.69 0.01 1.37 
s5 -0.027 -2.59 -0.028 -2.84 0.001 0.13 
s6 -0.032 -1.1 -0.031 -1.13 -0.001 -0.06 
s7 -0.010 -1.13 -0.01 -1.09 -0.001 -0.17 
s8 0.008 0.85 -0.003 -0.34 0.011 1.91 
s9 -0.01 -1.03 0.002 0.25 -0.012 -2.07 
s10 0.000 -0.01 0.005 0.9 -0.007 -1.42 
s11 -0.002 -0.2 0.012 1.36 -0.013 -2.42 
s12 0.001 0.12 -0.01 -1.06 0.011 1.83 
s13 0.022 2.29   0.02 2.2   0.002 0.36 
Adj. R2 0.14 0.19 0.08 
F - stat. 276.21 395.56 156.65 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
F - test results for sector fixed effects 
Hypothesis: s1=s2=…=s13=0. 
  
Total Debt Short term debt Long term debt 
F(13, 33191) 10.01 11.50 6.66 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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5.2 Small Firms’ and Medium Firms’ Results 
 
The results for small firms and medium firms are presented in Table 11. Like full 
sample estimates, all models are found to be statistically significant and have 
significant firm fixed effects. The signs of the estimated coefficients for small 
firms and medium firms are almost the same as those for the full sample. There 
are some differences on year effects. 
 
There exists a minor difference between size coefficients of small firms and 
medium firms for total debt. However, a one standard deviation change in log size 
of small and medium firms has the same effect on total debt. Both of them are 
expected to increase by 0.027 (0.294 x 0.091 for small firms and 0.282 x 0.094 for 
medium-sized firms). Moreover, size has a greater effect on long term debt for 
medium firms. This result confirms that firms use more long term debt as they get 
larger. 
 
Collaterals have higher effect on debt structure of small firms than medium firms. 
For small firms, when tangible assets increase one standard deviation, total debt 
ratio decreases by 0.045 (0.208 x -0.217). This number is equal to 0.039 (0.188 x -
0.205) for medium sized firms. As I indicate in the previous section, the negative 
effect of collateral on total debt can be explained by the effect on short term debt, 
as long term debt is positively affected by collateral. The findings suggest that 
medium firms are more likely to use their collaterals to issue long term debt.
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Table 11 - The results with firm and year fixed effects for small and medium sized firms 
 
Total Debt   Short term debt   Long term debt   
Variable Small t-statistic Medium t-statistic   Small t-statistic Medium t-statistic   Small t-statistic Medium t-statistic 
Size 0.091 8.30 0.094 9.71 0.036 3.11 0.022 2.40 0.056 7.54 0.072 10.28 
Tangible as. -0.217 -13.41 -0.205 -14.92 -0.292 17.28 -0.33 -25.05 0.076 6.98 0.125 12.63 
ROA -0.426 -31.17 -0.417 -41.80 -0.358 -25.02 -0.366 -38.30 -0.068 -7.45 -0.051 -7.03 
Intangible as. 0.135 3.06 0.208 4.73 -0.225 -4.84 -0.178 -4.22 0.360 12.12 0.386 12.18 
Growth 0.029 7.89 0.016 4.26 0.024 6.36 0.016 4.45 0.004 1.83 0.000 -0.02 
y98 0.153 12.71 0.133 16.66 0.130 10.29 0.116 15.17 0.023 2.90 0.017 2.93 
y99 0.141 12.84 0.142 18.90 0.125 10.87 0.116 16.09 0.016 2.19 0.026 4.82 
y00 0.132 13.20 0.106 14.84 0.129 12.38 0.096 14.12 0.003 0.38 0.009 1.81 
y01 0.162 17.29 0.173 24.36 0.136 13.84 0.139 20.34 0.026 4.19 0.034 6.73 
y02 0.108 12.73 0.092 14.18 0.089 10.09 0.078 12.41 0.018 3.26 0.015 3.17 
y03 0.074 9.50 0.048 7.85 0.063 7.70 0.045 7.70 0.011 2.15 0.003 0.65 
y04 0.012 1.63 -0.019 -3.26 0.026 3.30 -0.003 -0.55 -0.014 2.71 -0.016 -3.79 
y05 0.016 2.27 -0.015 -2.87 0.024 3.31 0.000 0.07 -0.008 -1.77 -0.016 -4.08 
y06 0.022 3.06 0.002 0.43 0.032 4.35 0.008 1.56 -0.011 -2.22 -0.006 -1.47 
y07 0.009 1.33 -0.023 -4.48   0.013 1.73 -0.008 1.74   -0.004 -0.80 -0.014 -3.90 
Adj. R2 0.66 0.68 0.63 0.66 0.52 0.55 
F - stat. 104.37 186.5 81.38 177.03 23.87 38.81 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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This result also indicates that lenders seem to be reluctance to provide long term 
finance to smaller firms.  
 
Profitability is negatively related for both samples as expected by pecking order 
theory. In addition, effect of one standard deviation change in profitability has a 
greater on medium sized (-0.185=0.443 x -0.417) firms than small sized firms     
(-0.139=0.327 x -0.426). This result shows that medium sized firms, which are 
more profitable, have more opportunities to decrease their debt ratios by using 
their profits. 
 
SMEs with high growth opportunities are expected to use more long term debt to 
finance their investments. It is found that the coefficient on intangible assets for 
medium firms is higher than that for small firms in long term debt regression. This 
result suggests that there may be more severe information asymmetry problems 
for small firms than medium firms. Therefore, medium sized firms are more likely 
to obtain more advantageous long term debt to fund their growth opportunities. 
 
Growth coefficients also support pecking order theory predictions. Growth has a 
stronger effect on small sized firms than medium sized firms. That is, fast 
growing small firms are more likely to have insufficient funds to finance their 
growth. However, the effect of growth on long term debt is found to be 
insignificant for both small and medium firms. 
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Medium sized firms finance higher proportion of their assets with long term debt 
which is also supported by the estimation with year effects.  For example in 2001, 
which is the year with highest debt level, 20% (0.034 / 0.173) of excess debt of 
medium firms is composed by long term debt while this number is 16% (0.026 / 
0.162) form small sized firms. 
 
Table 12 summarizes my hypotheses and the findings. The first column of the 
table denotes the variable that the hypothesis is associated with. The second and 
third columns give the hypotheses with different maturities (total debt: TD, long 
term debt: LTD and short term debt: STD). The fourth column presents my 
predictions that are explained in the thesis and the remaining columns report the 
observed results. The findings of the models with firm and year fixed effects 
support the hypotheses. One of the results that contradicts my expectations is the 
one regarding the size. I expect size to be negatively associated with short term 
debt but I observe the opposite. This might be the result of lenders’ tendency to 
use size as a tool to assess firms even for providing short term debt. Another 
contradicting result is the negative association of asset structure with total debt, 
which can be explained by the larger proportion of short term debt that Turkish 
SMEs have. Although asset tangibility has a positive impact on long term debt, 
the negative impact on short term debt compensates the effect on long term debt. 
Furthermore, the effect of size on total debt is found to be insignificant in 
regressions with sector and year fixed effects. Lastly, separating small and 
medium firms also does not change the results in testing hypotheses. 
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Table 12 – Predictions of hypotheses and observed results 
 
     All SMEs  Small firms Medium Firms 
 Hypotheses  Predictions  firm & year sector & year  firm & year firm & year 
Size 
H1 TD +   +  - (insig.)   + + 
H1-1 LTD +  + +  + + 
H1-2 STD -   + -   + + 
Asset 
Structure 
H2 TD +   - -   - - 
H2-1 LTD +  + +  + + 
H2-2 STD -   - -   - - 
Profitability 
H3 TD -   - -   - - 
H3-1 STD -  - -  - - 
H3-2 LTD -   - -   - - 
Growth 
Opportunities 
H4 TD +   + +   + + 
H4-1 STD -  - -  - - 
H4-2 LTD +   + +   + + 
Growth 
H5 TD +   + +   + + 
H5-1 STD +  + +  + + 
H5-2 LTD +    + (insig.) +   +  - (insig.) 
75
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5.3 Further Estimations 
 
As indicated in the data section, I use natural logarithm of adjusted total assets to 
measure size in my regressions. Since total assets are also used to scale debt, 
tangible assets, intangible assets and to calculate profitability and growth 
opportunities, it may cause multicollinearity problem in the estimations. 
Therefore, the number of workers employed in each firm is used as another 
variable for size. The correlation between size and number of workers is also high 
(0.66). Therefore, I repeat regressions by using the number of workers (in terms of 
100 workers) as a proxy for size and present the results in Table 13.  
 
Table 13 – Results with workers in place of size 
 
 Total Debt  Short term debt  Long term debt 
Variable Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic 
         
Workers 0.017 7.38  0.013 5.66  0.004 2.56 
Tangible as. -0.209 -20.54  -0.321 -31.88  0.112 15.91 
ROA -0.413 -52.07  -0.360 -45.90  -0.052 -9.49 
Intangible as. 0.203 6.64  -0.197 -6.50  0.399 18.84 
Growth 0.036 15.05  0.026 10.73  0.011 6.36 
y98 0.114 18.9  0.118 19.68  -0.004 -0.86 
y99 0.117 20.57  0.115 20.46  0.002 0.44 
y00 0.095 17.66  0.106 19.92  -0.011 -2.99 
y01 0.142 28.01  0.131 26.16  0.011 3.00 
y02 0.072 15.69  0.076 16.69  -0.004 -1.21 
y03 0.036 8.24  0.047 10.83  -0.011 -3.60 
y04 -0.022 -5.04  0.005 1.17  -0.027 -8.93 
y05 -0.010 -2.48  0.009 2.24  -0.020 -6.77 
y06 0.004 1.04  0.016 3.71  -0.011 -3.80 
y07 -0.014 -3.33   -0.001 -0.30   -0.012 -4.36 
Adj. R2 0.66   0.64   0.52  
F - stat 292.88   272.01   54.97  
Prob > F 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
 
 77 
 
Using number of workers does not cause significant changes in the results. The 
only difference is observed with respect to coefficients on year dummy variables. 
Hence I conclude that using logarithm of total assets for size does not bring any 
drawback. 
 
Tax rate is another variable that is commonly used in the literature as a capital 
structure determinant. Firms with higher tax rates are expected to use more debt 
(Michaelas et al., 1999). Tax rate is calculated as the ratio of the amount of taxes 
paid over profits before tax. I do not scale tax rate using total assets because taxes 
are depended on profits.  Hence, I also estimate regressions using tax rate as an 
additional variable.  
Table 14 – Results having tax as an additional variable 
 
 Total Debt  Short term debt  Long term debt 
Variable Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic 
         
Size 0.110 16.29  0.039 5.79  0.071 15.18 
Tangible as. -0.218 -21.48  -0.324 -32.16  0.107 15.15 
ROA -0.422 -53.28  -0.363 -46.02  -0.059 -10.82 
Intangible as. 0.179 5.89  -0.202 -6.66  0.381 18.04 
Growth 0.023 9.06  0.021 8.33  0.002 1.12 
Tax -0.002 -2.05  -0.001 -0.86  -0.001 -1.72 
y98 0.149 23.20  0.129 20.18  0.020 4.50 
y99 0.148 24.58  0.125 20.84  0.023 5.55 
y00 0.123 21.66  0.115 20.35  0.008 2.04 
y01 0.176 31.78  0.142 25.73  0.034 8.90 
y02 0.104 20.62  0.085 17.07  0.018 5.25 
y03 0.063 13.42  0.055 11.86  0.008 2.34 
y04 -0.004 -0.87  0.011 2.46  -0.015 -4.77 
y05 -0.001 -0.17  0.012 2.93  -0.013 -4.45 
y06 0.010 2.34  0.017 4.14  -0.007 -2.56 
y07 -0.010 -2.52   0.000 -0.02   -0.010 -3.59 
Adj. R2 0.66   0.64   0.53  
F - stat 290.33   255.22   66.47  
Prob > F 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
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Results given in Table 14 shows that tax rate has an insignificant effect on short 
term debt and long term debt. Its effect on total debt is significant at 5% level but 
it is very close to zero and negligible. Moreover, there is no change in the sign and 
significance of the other coefficients explaining capital structure of Turkish 
SMEs. In the literature, Michaelas et al. (1999) also find insignificant relation 
between tax rate and all three debt ratios for SMEs in the UK. Tax-rate has 
significantly negative effects on Spanish SMEs contrary to the expectations 
(Sogorb-Mira, 2005). He explains it with the desire of SME managers to keep 
control because high taxes indicate high profits and more profitable firms need 
less external finance. Degryse et al. (2010) report that tax rate has significant 
effect on leverage. They find the coefficient on tax rate is very small and 
economically negligible. Furthermore, there are some defects on taxes hence; the 
tax rate used in the estimation may not indicate the real rate on earned income. 
 
I also estimate regressions using bank credits to total assets and trade credits to 
total assets as dependent variables. Trade credits are very important especially for 
SMEs as emphasized by Beck et al. (2005). They act as a substitute for bank 
credit. I expect a positive relation between the amount of collateral and total debt 
(H2) but I find the opposite. However, regression results having bank debt in 
place of total debt given in Table 15 show that tangible assets are positively 
related with bank debt. This result indicates that collaterals are important for 
banks to evaluate SMEs. 
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Furthermore, since SMEs use more short term debt than long term debt, I also use 
the ratio of trade credit to total assets and short-term bank credits to total assets 
ratios as indicators of short term debt. The coefficients are expected to be 
significant in short term bank credit regressions but not in trade credit regressions. 
Table 16 shows that size is more important in obtaining short term bank debt than 
short term trade debt. Also, tangible assets are negatively associated with short 
term bank debt. This result is not surprising because firms tend to finance their 
tangible assets with long term bank debts.  
 
 
Table 15 – Regression results having total bank debt as dependent variable 
 
 Bank Debt 
Variable firm & year t 
   
Size 0.179 31.02 
Tangible as. 0.024 2.72 
ROA -0.117 -17.12 
Intangible as. 0.397 15.45 
Growth -0.013 -6.09 
y98 0.074 13.21 
y99 0.065 12.41 
y00 0.043 8.77 
y01 0.045 9.37 
y02 0.018 4.35 
y03 0.009 2.21 
y04 -0.024 -6.37 
y05 -0.024 -6.81 
y06 -0.009 -2.46 
y07 -0.016 -4.66 
Adj. R2 0.62  
F – stat 134.79  
Prob > F 0.0000  
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Table 16 – Regression results having short term bank debt and short term 
trade credit as dependent variables 
 
 Short term bank debt  Short term trade debt 
Variable Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic 
      
Size 0.105 20.53  -0.003 -0.61 
Tangible as. -0.065 -8.43  -0.150 -22.49 
ROA -0.086 -14.13  -0.152 -29.09 
Intangible as. 0.012 0.52  -0.155 -7.76 
Growth -0.013 -6.59  0.019 11.42 
y98 0.067 13.39  0.049 11.63 
y99 0.054 11.43  0.066 16.51 
y00 0.043 9.85  0.061 16.24 
y01 0.026 6.11  0.076 20.79 
y02 0.010 2.71  0.052 15.84 
y03 0.011 3.25  0.033 10.61 
y04 -0.009 -2.75  0.018 5.98 
y05 -0.008 -2.45  0.017 6.14 
y06 -0.001 -0.17  0.018 6.31 
y07 -0.007 -2.28   0.008 3.1 
      
Adj. R2 0.57   0.60  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Widely known capital structure theories like trade-off theory or pecking order 
theory can be used to formulate testable hypotheses to explain the capital structure 
determinants of SMEs. Following this idea, in this thesis, I empirically investigate 
the factors that determine financial structures of SMEs operating in manufacturing 
sector in Turkey. Using a panel data set of 44,029 firm-year observations over 11 
years, I provide results on magnitude, direction and significance of variables that 
affect financing decisions of SMEs. 
 
In general, my results support the predictions of pecking order theory. The results 
suggest that agency costs and asymmetric information costs play the most 
important role in financing decisions of SMEs. When the determinants of capital 
structure are evaluated individually, it is found that SMEs use more debt as they 
get larger. Larger firms also use relatively more long term debt, suggesting that 
information asymmetry problems decrease as size increases. Lenders seem to use 
collaterals as a tool to assess small firms. The results suggest that SMEs with 
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fewer tangible assets have more problems in obtaining external finance, especially 
long term debt. The results indicate that, firms are trying to match their maturity 
of assets and liabilities. That is, they have a tendency to finance their long term 
assets with long term debt and short term assets with short term debt. It is found 
that Turkish SMEs use profits to decrease their debt ratio since they might prefer 
funding from the source with lowest degree of asymmetric information. Also, they 
might use profits to decrease especially short term debt because it is more costly. 
Supporting maturity matching principle, Turkish SMEs are found to use growth 
opportunities to obtain long term debt. By this way, they may decrease their short 
term debts. Rapidly growing SMEs are found to increase their debt ratios. The 
results indicate that they use short term debt in the first place to finance their 
growth. 
 
F-test results show that there are significant differences among years in terms of 
the capital structures of SMEs. I observe that there is a negative relation between 
economic conditions and debt ratio. That is, firms are found to increase their debt 
levels when GDP level is decreasing. Also, 2001 is the year when banking crisis 
occurs in Turkey and debt ratios of the SMEs are the greatest. Although test 
results show that sub-sector differences does matter for financing decisions, only 
three out of fourteen sub-sectors have significantly different debt ratios than the 
base group. 
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Separate analyses of small and medium sized firms show that medium sized firms 
have relatively higher long term debt. This result suggests that information 
asymmetry problems are more severe for smaller firms. Moreover, smaller firms 
are found to be more dependent on their tangible assets to obtain debt. Since small 
firms obtain debt in relatively harder conditions, profitability has a greater impact 
on them which shows that pecking order is getting more valid as firms get 
smaller. Also, growth is found to have a greater impact on the capital structure of 
small firms since rapidly growing small firms are more likely to lack resource to 
finance their growth internally. 
 
In summary, capital structures of Turkish SMEs are in line with pecking order 
predictions and their behavior is similar to results observed in other countries. 
They decrease their both short term debt and long term debt levels as economic 
conditions improve although this relation is the opposite for long term debt in 
developed countries (Michaelas et al., 1999). Individual firm characteristics seem 
to be more important in explaining the capital structure of SMEs than industry 
characteristics. Results are found to be homogenous across small and medium 
firms. 
 
This thesis shows that there exist significant differences in the capital structures of 
SMEs over years and among sectors. Policy makers and lenders should take into 
consideration their sectors and the level of economic growth in developing new 
policies for the SMEs. The results suggest that the most desirable source of 
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financing for SMEs is retained earnings. So, the new policies can be designed to 
increase the profitability of SMEs as well as to improve their access to external 
finance. 
 
The results should be interpreted with caution. First, the data set used in this thesis 
is formed by voluntary participation of firms. There is self-selection bias. Their 
declarations are taken to be true in the analyses. Moreover, the data set represents 
only very small portion of all Turkish manufacturing SMEs even though it is the 
most comprehensive and available SME dataset. Lastly, this study investigates 
only firms operating in manufacturing sector. As a future study, SMEs from all 
sectors for a broader time period can be analyzed to discover the financial 
behaviors of firms from different industries and over different economical 
conditions. 
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